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quest could be contingent or absolute, and partial or total depending on the
scope of the request and the ability of the party requesting discovery to pay
relative to that of the party from whom discovery is requested. Although widespread use of such a provision is probably unnecessary, it should be considered
as a viable option in extreme cases. If a party is given the choice of having its
request denied or paying for compliance with the request, the true materiality
of the information will be implicit in his decision.
CONCLUSION

The extensive discovery characteristic of modern antitrust suits has led to
the inefficient administration of justice and a frustration of the national economic policy goals. The broad and liberal philosophy of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which are designed to avoid trial by ambush have led to trial
by avalanche in complex cases. The procedural notion of discovery relevance
has been an expansive rather than a limiting force in discovery, lacking a clear
definition or even a decision framework in which to make relevancy determinations.
Increased focus on the external effects of discovery in complex litigation has
the potentially beneficial effect of aligning antitrust discovery with the goals of
antitrust policies and the Federal Rules. 148 By incorporating more external
considerations into the Rules themselves or by judicially incorporating them
into relevancy determinations, more accurate and realistic discovery rulings
are possible.
JOHN

G. DESPRIET

THE DEVELOPING FAIRNESS STANDARD IN
FREEZE-OUT MERGERS: DETOUR FOR
DELAWARE IN THE "RACE FOR THE BOTTOM"?
INTRODUTION

In a corporate merger, the terms of the merger agreement dictate the interest received by the absorbed corporation's stockholders in exchange for their
shares.' Generally this interest consists of common stock in the subsequent
enterprise. There are, however, situations in which the surviving corporation's
owners also have a controlling interest in the merged corporation and wish to
eliminate a minority interest. Rather than granting this minority common
148. See Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust, Other Than Competition and Efficiency: What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 119 (1977).
1. See 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §7067
ed. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251(b) (Supp. 1977).
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stock, payment is made with cash or debt securities. This purposeful exclusion,
when not accomplished pursuant to a legitimate business goal, is known as a
freeze-out. 2
Freeze-outs have been the subject of cases dating back to the turn of the
century. 3 Their frequency, and the accompanying legal controversy, peaked in
the 1970's, precipitated particularly by the now infamous bear market of
1974. 4 Large numbers of businesses had gone public - offered their securities
for public sale- in the bull market period of the late 1960's.5 As the Dow
Jones average plummetted a few years later, dropping over 400 points in the
1973-74 span,6 many corporations found they could repurchase their own shares
at a fraction of the issuance price. The incidence of freeze-outs thus rose significantly, generally pursuant to management's desire to "go private." 7 The
term "going private" technically refers to a process by which the total number
of stockholders is decreased below 300, s a status eliminating SEC requirements
of annual filing for a public corporation. 9 More importantly, such practice also
concentrates earnings participation and corporate control in the remaining
stockholders.o
Acquisition of controlling interest and subsequent freeze-out of the minority
stockholders generally involves two stages. The first is a tender offer,1 with the
2. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder'sAppraisal Right, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
3. See Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23,74 Pac. 1004 (1904).
4. The Dow Jones Index dropped 400 points in less than two years, reaching a low of
577.6 after having broken 1000 in January of 1973. FAcrs ON FME YEARBooK 1087 (1974).
5. In the period from 1967 to 1972 over 3000 corporations filed registration statements
with the SEC. Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, 278 SEc. REG.
Am L. RP. (BNA) D-1 (1974).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. In a freeze-out situation, the benefits would be realized by the majority shareholders
through the vehicle of the corporation.
8. If the total number of shareholders falls below 300, the corporation may deregister
with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. §781(g)(4) (1970).
9. The cost of being public for an average corporation listed on the American Stock Exchange, including auditing and legal fees, annual meetings, stockholder notification, and stock
certificates, has been estimated at between $75,000 to $2000,000 annually. A significant percentage of this expense may be saved by going private. See Borden, Going Private- Old Tort,
New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 987, 1007 (1974). See also Note, Going Private:Who
Shall Provide the Remedies?, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 131, 132 (1976).
10. Acquisition of exclusive corporate control, along with deregistration, is the major
incentive for freeze-out mergers. Even when a corporation has less than 300 shareholders, a
freeze-out might pose an attractive proposition. In a period of deflated stock prices, majority
stockholders can freeze-out the minority at an advantageous price, thereby excluding them
from earnings participation and policy formulation. A typical example involves a large family
business that developed over a period of years and went public in the late 1960's with 100
stockholders. When stock prices dropped in 1974, the family could exclude the minority
stockholders and regain exclusive control through a freeze-out, assuming they retain
a sufficient percentage of stock. See People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371
N.YS.2d 550 (1975) (family business had gone public in the 1960's, with family retention of
68% of common stock; attempted freeze-out in 1974).
11. A "tender offer" is a device used to acquire control of a target corporation by offering to purchase a number of shares at a stated price. See W. CARY & R. BA=ER, CoapoRATxoNs:
CASES AND MArams 236-37, 1633-35 (4th ed. 1969).
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obvious goal of attaining all minority shares. Rarely, however, do all offerees
accept the tender.' 2 Elimination of the remaining minority interest is then
accomplished through the freeze-out merger. This requires a parent-subsidiary
relationship, in which the majority transfers all its interest to a parent shell
corporation existing solely as a merger vehicle. 13 The newly formed parent then
merges with the principal corporation. This transaction will encounter little
difficulty, because the dominant stockholders control both entities. 14 The
terms of the merger require that ownership of the resulting entity be completely in the hands of the parent. The minority is offered cash or debt securities and has the alternative of statutory appraisal if they are dissatisfied with
the parent's valuation.' 5
CHALLENGES TO STATUTORY APPRAISAL AS AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

Statutory appraisal, as frozen-out shareholder's remedy, has generated considerable controversy.' 6 If the dissenter feels that the valuation by the dominant
stockholders understates the value of his shares, he may demand a judicial
proceeding to determine fair value.17 Problems have arisen because many jurisdictions, most notably Delaware, historically considered appraisal as the exclusive remedy available to dissenting stockholders in a freeze-out.' 8 Such
12. In a tender offer, a purchaser generally makes an offer to buy a stated number of
shares at a price above current market value. The presence of the premium attracts buyers,
and the higher price offered leads to an increase in the number of sellers. Because certain
stockholders may see a potential in the stock which they feel is not matched by the tender
offer, they may choose to hold the stock. See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate
Acquisition by Tender Oger, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967); Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967); Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate
Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499 (1967).
13. Mergers accomplished through the vehicle of a shell corporation have been discussed
by a number of commentators. See Borden, supra note 9, at 988; Note, Going Private, 84 YALE
L.J. 903, 910 (1975); Note, Going Private:An Analysis of Federaland State Remedies, 44 FoRD.

L.

REV.

796, 799 (1976).

14. Typical of merger statute provisions for this situation is DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251
(1974 & Supp. 1977). In Delaware, a merger requires majority approval of both corporate
parties. Id. §251(c). If the parent owns 90% of the subsidiary, the transaction would qualify
under the short-form merger statute. Id. §253. This provision enables the parent to transact
a merger without observing the procedural requirement of subsidiary approval.
15. A dissenting shareholder has a statutory right to insist upon a hearing, at which a
court-appointed appraiser submits evidence concerning share value. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§262 (1974 & Supp. 1977). See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text. The appraisal remedy
is not available to a shareholder of a corporation that is 1) registered on a national securities
exchange or 2) held of record by at least 2,000 stockholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(k)
(Supp. 1977). The reasoning for these restrictions is that the stockholder is guaranteed a
market due to the presence of a large number of stockholders; if one disagrees with the merger
plans, the shares can be sold on the open market.
16. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 2; Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders
and Management in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969);
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HAv. L. Rzv.
297, 304-07 (1974).
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
18. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Matteson
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rationale treats the dispute as concerned only with value of investment, regarding the legal status of the minority stockholder as equivalent whether that
value be in securities or cash.19
A judicial philosophy treating appraisal as an exclusive remedy can work
a significant hardship upon the minority stockholder.2 0 Appraisal statutes demand strict procedural compliance, which if not observed can deprive the
dissenter of standing. 21 Beyond this threshhold qualification lie further pitfalls.

The appraisal process is costly, including both attorneys fees and expenses for
financial analysts. Often these costs are borne by the dissenter unless the ap-

praised value is found to materially exceed the amount offered by the corpora-

tion. 22 The potential expenses could easily exceed the disputed value, rendering the remedy practical only for those holding large blocs of stock. 2s Additionally, the appraisal procedure commonly extends over long periods of time,

during which the stockholder receives neither dividends nor return of his
24
capital investment.
Successful challenges by dissenters are unusual. 25 Management will necessarily possess greater knowledge of corporate opportunities and future economic developments that may influence the corporation. Such information
would result as much from an experienced sense of the industry as from any
written, and hence discoverable, document.26 This disadvantage is compounded
v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d.1025 (1952). But see Ribakove v. Rich, 13 Misc. 2d 98,
173 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
19. For a discussion of investment form versus the monetary value of investment, see
Note, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by Merger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV.
115, 128 (1975). See generally Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MicH. L. REv.
1165 (1940); Levy, Rights of DissentingShareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORN. L.Q.

420 (1930).
20.

See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1200-05; Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A

Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 490 (1976) (investors forced to forego investment opportunity and realize undesired tax consequences).
21. Procedural requirements must be strictly observed or the appraisal remedy is forfeited.
A shareholder must file a dissent with the corporation prior to a vote on the merger, if the
merger is approved, the shareholder must demand fair payment within a specified period;
should the shareholder disagree with the corporation's offer of "fair value," he must again
notify the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262 (1974 S, Supp. 1977).
22. In Delaware, fees are taxed upon parties by the court "as appears to be equitable."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(h) (Supp. 1977).
23. It has been stated that appraisal is not financially practical unless the investor holds
at least 20,000 shares. Dun's Review at 64 (Jan. 1975). See also Note, Appraisal of Corporate
Dissenters' Shares: Apportioning the Proceeding'sFinancialBurdens, 60 YA

L.J. 337 (1951)

(corporations should bear a greater share of appraisal costs).
24. Dividends are retained by the corporation and no capital recoupment occurs until
settlement of the proceeding. Some states, such as Florida, provide for payment of interest
during this period. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §607.247(8) (1977). In Delaware, the accrued interest
is delivered to the stockholder at the time of final payment. DaL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(g)
(Supp. 1977).
25. Eisenberg has written that appraisal is a "remedy of desperation" and is "unlikely to
produce a better result." Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 85. See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1201.
26. The Delaware appraisal provisions state that "[u]pon application by any stockholder
entitled to participate in the appraisal proceeding or by the corporation, the court may, in its
discretion, permit discovery or other pretrial proceedings .... DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262(f)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss4/5

4

Seider:
The Developing Fairness Standard in Freeze-Out Mergers: Detour fo
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXX

for the challenging dissenter by the courts' historical tendency to follow conservative valuation practices.27 Particularly unsatisfactory results might arise
where a corporation's business ventures are speculative and the probability of
success is only subjectively predictable.28
In a freeze-out, even where the shareholder agrees with the valuation, he
might nonetheless object to deprivation of the investment opportunity, on the
29
ground that the form, as well as the value, of the investment is important.
Finally, the forced conversion of stock into cash or debt securities necessarily
involves tax consequences which might be unfavorable to the stocldaolder.30
Confronted with such unfavorable prospects, a number of dissenting minority stockholders have challenged the validity of the freeze-out merger itself. 31 Some have attacked the constitutionality of the merger statute, alleging
that due process rights are violated by deprivation of investment form.32 However, in light of the appraisal remedy, courts have upheld the constitutionality
of freeze-out mergers without exception.33 The rule was stated quite bluntly by
one court: "This statute clearly anticipates a 'cash payout' by which minority
stockholders may be frozen out of continued participation in the merged corporation."3 4 In another line of attack, dissenting shareholders have contended
that they are owed a fiduciary duty beyond technical statutory compliance.
Judicial response, typified by Delaware, held for many years that statutory
compliance was sufficient.3 5 Recently, however, major changes in the Delaware
(Supp. 1977). Still, the management is certainly in the best position to appreciate the economic
potential of the corporation in the particular industry.
27. The result reached by the court in a particular instance depends upon the type of
valuation practice used. For an excellent analysis of valuation techniques see Note, Valuation
of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HAIv. L. REv. 1453 (1966). See also
D. HEawrrz, Bususs PLANNING 24 (1966) (particular attention paid to Delaware cases).
28. See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1201-02.
29. See note 19 supra. See Greene, supra note 20, at 490 (stockholder feels that the investment opportunity cannot be matched in the marketplace).
30. See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1203.
31. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.
2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
32. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 993, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 57
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (court found that "a stockholder has no constitutionally protected right to
continue as a stockholder so long as the value of his interest is compensable'); Beloff v. Consol
Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 37
Del. Ch. 58, 154 A.2d 893 (1959).
33. One court has described the rights of a stockholder in such a situation as follows:
"[The stockholder] has only one real right; to have the value of his holdings protected, and
that protection is given him by his right to an appraisal." Beloff v. Consol. Edison Co., 300
N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.2d 561, 564 (1949). See also Comment, Jurisdictionof the California Corporations Commissioner Over Delaware: Short-Form Mergers, 52 CAuF. L. R.EV. 1016, 1034
(1964) (discusses the constitutionality and fairness of short-form mergers).
34. Wilcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 201, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966).
35. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). A similar attitude was
evidenced by a New York court in Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., where it flatly stated
that when appraisal was available, it was an exclusive remedy. 202 Misc. 988, 992, 115 N.Y.S.2d
52, 55 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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stance have led to recognition of fiduciary duties extending beyond mere
statutory compliance s6
This note will examine developments in the standard of fairness applied in
freeze-out merger disputes to determine the nature of the duty owed and effects
of recent changes. Emphasis will be on Delaware because of its leadership in
terms of corporate registrations and the resulting widespread influence of its
corporate laws.37
THE TRADrriONAL DELAWARE STAI'0ARD

Delaware has long been recognized as a management-oriented jurisdiction.38
This attitude is evidenced by its liberal corporate laws, which have generally
been the nation's least restrictive, and the corresponding permissive interpretation by the Delaware courts.3 9 A particular series of cases involving mergers
have indicated a marked management bias.40 A merger that would have eliminated accrued dividends was challenged by preferred stockholders in Federal
United Corp. v. Havender.41 The court stated that although the right to
dividends could not be altered by charter amendment, this did not exclude
such an alteration through a merger undertaken pursuant to statutory provisions that warned the shareholder that his right was defeasible.42 In MacCrone v. American CapitalCorp.43 a merger was challenged by the minority on
grounds of unfairness and lack of business purpose. It was held that the
reasons for a merger or its business necessity were not matters for judicial
scrutiny.45 This general doctrine was extended in Stauffer v. StandardBrands,
Inc.,4 6 where dissenting shareholders challenged a short-form merger.47 The
36. See Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); see notes 112-140 infra and accompanying text.
37. A striking example of Delaware's corporate popularity is furnished by an examination
of companies registered on the New York Stock Exchange. As of March 31, 1976, 655 out of
1,542 (42%) were incorporated in Delaware. Note, Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 U. MicH. L. REv. 1023, 1032
n.36 (1976).
38. Professor Cary focused upon Delaware and its history of attracting corporations
through enabling legislation and liberal judicial interpretations in his renowned article Cary,
Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflection Upon Delaware, 83 YAr L.J. 663 (1974). See Comment, Law For Sale: A Study of the Delaware CorporationLaw of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. Rlnv.
861 (1969): see note'37 supra.
39. See generally, Cary, supranote 38.
40. Delaware courts have stated that mergers are "provided for by the laws of the state,
and to that extent are encouraged and favored." MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16
Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (Ch. 1928).
41. 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
42. 24 Del. Ch. at 344, 11 A.2d at 342.
43. 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943).
44. Id. at 464.
45. Id. at 469. A similar attitude was evidenced in Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Co., where the
court stated that "absent fraud ... it is the policy of the courts of Delaware to permit contracting corporations to take advantage of statutory devices for corporate consolidation
furnished by legislative act." 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (Ch. 1961).
46. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §253 (1974 &Supp. 1977).
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court declared that the obvious goal of the short-form merger statute "is to
provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority
shareholder interest in the enterprise."''8 The development of this standard of
mere statutory compliance was completed in David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley
Industries, Inc. 49 In that case, dissenting shareholders challenged the valua-

tion method, alleging self-dealing on the part of the directors and officers.-0
The court found that the rights of minority stockholders under a long-from
merger 51 were no greater than those under the short-form and would thus be
governed by the statutory compliance standard.52 The sole obligation of the
corporation was the observance of literal statutory procedure;5 3 there was no
requirement of proper business purpose for the merger, necessarily classifying
disputes as mere valuation conflicts and leaving appraisal as the exclusive
54
remedy.
The management bias of Delaware's corporate law has long been a topic of
interest to commentators.5 5 :Evidence of this bias in the merger area was noted
by Professor Folk, 56 who wrote that the Delaware corporate code, particularly
the 1967 revision, "reflects the 'continuing legislative approval' of mergers and
the avoidance of their disruption by protesting stockholders."57 This philosophy has obvious attraction to management, leading to Delaware's leadership
in corporate registrations., ' The success has not gone unnoticed, however, and
other states have passed liberal corporate laws to emulate Delaware's attraction. 59 The result has been a marked shift toward liberalization, 60 with states
48. 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
49. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
50. Id. at 31.
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
52. 281 A.2d at 35.
53. The Delaware long-form merger statute provides that the following steps be followed:
The boards of directors of the corporate parties to the merger shall adopt a resolution which
states the terms of the merger and method of effectuation; the agreement shall be submitted
to the stockholders at an annual or special meeting; a majority of the outstanding stock must

approve; if approved, the agreement must be filed with state authorities.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, §251
54.
55.
56.

(1974 & Supp. 1977).
See note 15 supra.
See note 38 supra.
Folk is a professor at University of Virginia School of Law and the author of a well
known work analyzing Delaware corporate law, E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW

(1972).

57. E. FOLK, supra note 56, at 332.
58. See note 37 supra.
59. Indeed, that was how Delaware attained its position originally. In the early 1900's
New Jersey had the most liberal corporate code and highest number of corporate registrations
in the nation. In 1913, Governor Woodrow Wilson sponsored seven laws sharply restricting
the discretion allowed officials of New Jersey corporations. Many corporations registered there
promptly re-registered in Delaware, which had passed a liberal corporate code.
Other states, noting Delaware's success, have passed liberal codes of their own. In this
sense, Professor Cary has written that "Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a
system contributing to the deterioration of corporate standards." Cary, supra note 38, at 663.
60. For example, the Michigan legislature feared that corporate registrations would drop
due to Delaware's revisions in 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. As a result it adopted new corporate
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vying to offer the most attractive corporate home, a syndrome which Professor
Gary has labeled "race for the bottom." 61
This management trend has been criticized as an abandonment of stockholder protection.6- Cary has challenged Delaware in particular with the accusation that there was "[p]erhaps ...no public policy left in Delaware corpo-

rate law except the objective of raising revenue." 63 Even the Model Business
Corporation Act, once held out as an alternative providing for investor protection,6 4 has been modified to compete with Delaware law. 65 The conclusion
has been drawn that, as a practical matter, Delaware corporation law is national corpoition law.6
Itis interesting to compare judicial response to a dissenter's complaint
under Delaware law with that of other jurisdictions. One example is Bryan v.
Brock & Blevins, Inc., 67 a Fifth Circuit decision concerning Georgia's merger
statute.63 Plaintiff Bryan, a dissenting shareholder, was a retired employee own-

ing stock in his former employer, a closely held corporation.69 When Bryan refused offers from the other owners to sell his shares,7 0 they formed a shell
corporation to merge with the principal, freezing out Bryan through a merger
2
agreement provision 7 ' calling for the purchase of all outstanding stocky

Bryan sued to enjoin the merger, alleging that it was a scheme to defraud him
73
of his shareholder's status.
The interpretation of the statute, nearly identical in its provisions with
that of Delaware,7 4 was presented to the Fifth Circuit as a matter of first impression. Rather than refer to the considerable body of Delaware case law on
laws with the intent to "out-Delaware Delaware." Downs, Michigan to Have A New Corporation Code?, 18 WAYNE L. Rxv. 913, 914 (1972).

61. Cary, supra note 38, at 666. Justice Brandeis referred to the deterioration of investor
safeguards as a race "not of diligence, but of laxity." Ligett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

62. One commentator noted: "The significant vested rights that orthodoxy once attributed
-to the shareholder interest ... have long since been sacrificed on the altar of corporate flexibility." Borden, supra note 9, at 1020-21.
63. See Cary, supra note 38, at 684.
64. Id. at 655-56.
65. For an examination of some of these changes, see Scott, Changes in the Model Business
CorporationAct, 24 Bus. LAw. 291 (1968); Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of
Indemnification of Directors,Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAw. 95 (1967).
66. See E. FOLK, supra note 56, at xii.
67. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. GA. CODE ANN. § §22-1001 et seq. (1977).
69. A close corporation is one whose stock is held by a small group which generally composes the management. See W. CARY & R. BAKER, supra note 11, at 362-64; see generally
F. O'NEAt, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcriCE (1958).
70. The other owners contended that it was established corporate policy to keep all stock
ownership in the hands of active employees. The court seemed somewhat dubious about such
policy as a valid business purpose, largely because the corporation delayed over a year before
pressing the point. 490 F.2d at 569.
71. The terms of the merger agreement control the transaction and are binding on both
corporate parties and their stockholders. See note I supra and accompanying text.
72. 490 F.2d at 568.
73.

Id. at 567.

74. DEL.

8,
CODE ANN. tit.

§251 (1974 & Supp. 1977). See note 53 supra.
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point,75s the court looked to federal cases establishing fiduciary standards, particularly Lebold v. Inland Steel-6 and Pepper v. Litton.7 7 It determined that
these cases mandated a construction of the statute "comporting with equity in
good conscience."78 Applying this finding to the immediate facts, the court
found that the shell corporation possessed no business purpose7 9 but was used
merely to do indirectly what could not be done directly s - force the sale of
the shares. While the statutory provisions were technically followed, the court
held that principles of fiduciary duty had not been met and required that the
merger be enjoined.81
This decision contrasts markedly with that of a subsequent federal district
court decision involving Delaware law. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. 2 involved a planned merger between Meridian Corporation and a
Delaware corporation's subsidiary that owned the majority of Meridian's
stock. 3 The mergees were involved in similar lines of business, and it was
hoped that the merger wold increase operating efficiency and preclude conflicts of interest84 A dissenting stockholder alleged that the merger was invalid
solely because it was accomplished through the vehicle of a shell corporation.85
The court disagreed, noting the merger's valid business purpose and the ab75. See notes 39-54 supra and accompanying text.
76. 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1942) (court found breach of fiduciary duty when majority
owner squeezed out minority through liquidation and started business again after purchasing
assets).
77. 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (Supreme Court upheld the disallowance of a bankruptcy claim of
a controlling stockholder as a violation of his fiduciary duty to the general stockholders).
78. 490 F.2d at 570.
79. The business purpose test adopted by the Bryan court was originally formulated in
Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (Ziebarth Corporation froze out
an 11% stockholder who was blocking a merger with Gold Seal, Inc., a move which appeared
to be the only hope for survival for Ziebarth. Because the merger was a financial necessity, the
court found it was undertaken for a legitimate business purpose).
80. The court quoted from the Supreme Court opinion in Pepper v. Litton: "He cannot
violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation that which he could not
do directly." 490 F.2d at 570 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 311).
81. 490 F.2d at 571.
82. 392 F. Supp. 1939 (N.D. Fla. 1974). A merger was to be executed under authority of
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251 (1974) (amended Supp. 1977), because it was an internal function
of the corporation controlled by the law of the state of incorporation. 17 W. FLErcHR,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS

§8326 (1977); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The

suit itself was in federal court because the plaintiff had alternatively challenged its validity
under §78a of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as well as under state law. Through
pendent jurisdiction, the court decided the case under state law. 392 F. Supp. at 1396.
83. 392 F. Supp. at 1396.
84. DLJRE, a subsidiary corporation, and Meridian dealt principally in real estate. It
was anticipated that consolidation of operations would avoid duplication of expense and result in substantial savings. Id. at 1399. Consolidation would also avoid any future complaints
by minority shareholders of Meridian that the parent was discriminating against Meridian by
awarding an unfair percentage of contracts to its wholly-owned subsidiary.
85. It has been suggested that freeze-out mergers in which the majority in interest of a
corporation transfers its shares to a corporate shell for the purpose of obtaining exclusive
control should be abolished. Greene, supra note 20, at 512. Plaintiff's proposal of a flat rule
invalidating all mergers accomplished through the use of a shell corporation goes well beyond this proposal. 392 F. Supp. at 1403.
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sence of fraudulent motives.8 6 Apart from an apparent similarity to the business
purpose test employed in Bryan,8 7 however, a statement of Delaware merger
policy88 indicated the decision's true basis: "It is dear that the Delaware legislature has determined that a stockholder has no absolute right to his interest in
the corporation."89 This analysis of Delaware law by an independent tribunal

reflects that state's satisfaction with appraisal as an exclusive remedy,90 a

philosophy far afield from the fiduciary stance adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Bryan.
The New York merger statute,91 patterned after Delaware law,92 was at
issue in Schuiwolf v. Cerro Corp.98 That case, decided two years after Bryan

and Grimes,94 involved a merger of corporations in similar businesses, one'of
which was a wholly owned subsidiary of G.L. Corporation, the other principally owned by G.L.95 Because of the presence of a proper business purpose"
and lack of self-dealing, the court found that the majority had violated no

fiduciary duty.97 As in Bryan, corporate purpose was stressed. However, unlike
Grimes or Stauffer,98 there was no statement that a stockholder has no absolute
right to his corporate interest 9 .
In a comparison of various states' attitudes towards fiduciary duty, Cali-

fornia- and Delaware provide the most dramatic contrast. The California
Supreme Court issued a rather revolutionary decision in the 1969 case of Jones
86. Id. at 1404.
87. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra.
88. See notes 38-54 supra and accompanying text.
89. 392 F. Supp. at 1403.
90. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
91. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§901 et seq. (Consol. 1976 & Supp. 1977).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
93. 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
94. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
95. 86 Misc. 2d at 293-94, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
96. As in Grimes, the business purpose in Schuiwolf was efficiency of operation through
consolidation of similar businesses. 86 Misc. 2d at 298, 380 N.YS.2d at 962.
97. Self-dealing occurs when a parent corporation, by definition controlling both parties
to a transaction, causes a subsidiary to act so as to benefit the parent to the exclusion or detriment of the minority shareholder of the subsidiary. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971).
The court in Schutwolf interpreted self-dealing in a fashion contrary to a pair of cases immediately preceding it. In People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550
(Sup. Ct. 1975) and Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 86, 342 A.2d 566 (1975),
the courts enjoined mergers planned for the exclusive purpose of freezing out minority stockholders. Both courts specifically mentioned the fact that merger financing was arranged solely
through the existing corporate structure. Because this was, in effect, the use of stockholders'
capital as the basis for a loan for freezing many of them out, it invoked an impression of extreme unfairness. In Schulwolf, a valid business purpose was found to be controlling, but the
court added of its own volition that sources of financing and benefit to the majority stockholders were not to be considered once the valid business purpose was established. 86 Misc. 2d
at 298, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
98. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
99. The business purpose test used in evaluating the long-form merger in Schulwolf was
later applied to a short-form merger in Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan
v. Universal Food Specialities, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co.100 The facts there did not specifically involve a
merger; rather, they concerned a usurpation of business opportunity by dominant stockholders.101 United Savings and Loan Association's stock had a very
thin trading market due to its high book value and the fact that the corporation was closely held.102 Defendants, holders of 87 percent of the outstanding
stock, wished to increase their stock's commercial attraction to take advantage
of the very receptive stock market of the period. 0 3 Therefore, they transferred
their shares to a new corporation of their own creation, United Financial
Corporation, receiving 250 shares of United for each Association share. 04
United, with its stock now at an attractive low trading price due to the split, 0 5
with debentures backed by Association assets, and with publicity gained through
the various financial maneuverings, made very successful public offerings.06
During these activities Association's minority stockholders were never allowed
0
an opportunity to exchange their shares for United Shares,1
1' and the once thin
market for Association stock was now nonexistent as a practical matter, with
United as the only buyer'C5 The court found that the majority had an affirmative duty to offer the minority an opportunity to exchange their shares or to
provide them with an alternative at least as favorable as that created for the
majority.109 The effect of this holding, diametric in theory from the policies
100. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
101. 1 Cal. 3d at 105, 460 P.2d at 469, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
102. 1 Cal. 3d at 105, 460 P.2d at 466, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594. The Association had 6,568
shares outstanding, and H.F. Ahmanson & Co. owned 4,171. The total number of other stockholders was relatively small; this, combined with a trading price of over $1000 per share, resulted in relatively little trading.
103. Investor interest in savings and loan stocks increased in the later 1950's, with the
result that such stocks enjoyed a steady increase in market price from 1958 to 1962. Defendants
incorporated United Financial in 1959 to take advantage of that market. I Cal. 3d at 102, 460
P.2d at 467, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595.

104. Id.
105. The exchange of one share of Association stock for 250 shares of United had the same
type of effect on price as would a declared intra-corporate stock split of 250:1.
106. 1 Cal. 3d at 103-04, 460 P.2d at 467-68, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
107. 1 Cal. 3d at 103, 460 P.2d at 467, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
108. The controlling factor, however, was not detrimental to the minority in terms of
stock marketability. Rather than analyze the transaction in terms of detriment to the
minority, Chief Justice Traynor formulated a test of affirmative duty on the part of the majority. 1 Cal. 3d at 113-14, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04.
109. Id. In fashioning a standard of affirmative duty, Traynor cited Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1955), a case heavily cited in textbooks and scholarly works as revolutionary in its theory but rarely applied in actual case law. Perlman involved the sale of the
majority interest in a steel manufacturer during the Korean War, when steel was in great
demand. The court found that a portion of the sale price consisted of a premium, paid for
control of the corporation in that opportunistic context. The court held that the premium
was a corporate asset, and thus the seller had an obligation to share it pro rata with the
other stockholders. In Jones, Traynor found that the exchange of stock resulted in a trading
or market premium, increasing the price of United stock above its book value. The court
regarded the premium as a corporate asset of the Association with an accompanying duty of

the majority to allow minority stockholders to exchange their shares and benefit from that
trading premium. 1 Cal. 3d at 113-14, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04. See generally
Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in
Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956).
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endorsed by the Delaware judiciary, was seen in Jutkowitz v. Bowens,110 a California superior court decision. The court stated that in a freeze-out situation
the minority had a right to maintain an enterprise interest, and thus forced
the establishment of a reserve account of shares to be made available to dissenting shareholders. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STERLING-SINGER STANDARD

The previous discussion of the Delaware standard of fairness applicable in
a merger dispute is well illustrated by the Delaware Chancery Court opinion in
Singer v. Magnavox,"? a 1976 case. In this case, a dissenting shareholder alleged that a merger between Magnavox and T.M.C. Development Corporation
was fraudulent because it served no business purpose. 113 T.M.C. was a shell
corporation, intended solely as a merger vehicle. It was the subsidiary of North
American Philips Development Corporation, which had been organized by
North American for the express purpose of conducting a tender offer 1 4 for
Magnovox shares. 5 Reviewing Delaware precedent concerning merger disputes, particularly Staufferllo and Schenley,117 the court determined that "as a

general principle Delaware courts will not inquire into the reasons motivating
a merger or the business justification for it as a part of determining its validity."1 1 " Because there was no question of compliance with technical statutory

requirements, the court dismissed the action.11 9

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court2 ° disagreed, requiring not only a
proper business purpose but adopting a test of entire fairness which could
1 21
invalidate a merger even upon the showing of a legitimate business purpose.
Because Justice Duffy was chiefly concerned with fiduciary duty,322 his view
110. No. CA. 000268 (Cal. Super Ct. Nov. 19, 1975).
111. The majority stockholders in a family-dominated corporation wished to re-establish
exclusive family ownership in Jutkowitz, using a shell corporation to freeze out the non-family
shareholders. See Small, Corporate Combinations under the New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L, R v. 1190, 1218 n.137 (1976).
112. 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
113. Id. at 1353.
114. NA. Phillips Development was organized as a wholly-owned subsidiary of North
American for the sole purpose of effecting a tender offer for Magnavox shares. It did so from
August through October of 1974, acquiring 84.1% of Magnavox common stock. T.M.C. was
subsequently organized in May of 1975, following the establishment of the merger agreement,
for the express purpose of merging with Magnavox. Id. at 1352.
115. The freeze-out would cause Magnavox to "go private," as after the merger North
American would be the sole shareholder. SEC requirements of filing and shareholder notification would no longer apply and concerns of future shareholder complaints could be avoided.
See notes 8 8:9 supra.
116. See note 46 supra.
117. See note 49 supra.
118. 367 A.2d at 1355.
119. Id. at 1362.
120. 880 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
121. Id. at 980.
122. The analyses in Bryan, Schulwolf and Matteson were principally concerned with the
existence of some valid business purpose for the merger, along with propriety of valuation
techniques. Duffy refused to adopt a strict business purpose standard, stating that such an
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differed from previous statutory analyses in Delaware and from the financial
analyses of courts employing the business purpose test. He concluded that the
majority could not meet their fiduciary obligation through simple statutory
compliance with an appraisal option in the alternative. 23 Such a proposition
was regarded as a mistaken emphasis on value of investment, when the form
124
of investment was an equally important factor.
The opinion found its authority in common law rather than statutory
provisions. The court relied on past Delaware cases involving corporate
fiduciary responsibility, with the emphasis on Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp.'25 and Guth v. Loft, Inc.128 Sterling was the state's leading "interested
merger" example, establishing that a dominant corporation, as a majority stockholder standing on both sides of a transaction, has the burden of establishing
its entire fairness to the minority, subject to a strict scrutiny. 127 In Guth, where
a corporation's president was guilty of using company resources and credit to
develop a new corporation, the court found that a fiduciary duty had been
violated, holding that the question was not "to be decided on narrow or technical grounds, but upon broad considerations of corporate duty and loyalty."' 128
Justice Duffy contended that analyses such as these were consistent with the
historical practice of Delaware's judiciary in minority stockholder suits, because "Delaware courts have long announced and enforced high standards
which govern the internal affairs of corporations chartered here, particularly
when fiduciary relations are under scrutiny."129 Despite these references to high
action would lead to questions of "whose purpose" or "whose business?". He felt that those
potentially confusing inquires tended to cloud the real issues: what claims were advanced
by the competing parties and, what was the nature of their relationship. Id. at 976.
123. Id. at 980. The certificate of incorporation apparently specifically provided the appraisal option. It was not statutorily required because Magnavox was listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. See note 15 supra.
124. Id. at 977.
125. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). Sterling involved a merger between Hilton
Hotel Corporation and its subsidiary, Mayflower Hotel Corporation. Hilton's management
successfully established the validity of its valuation of Mayflower shares, satisfying the fairness
burden which was shifted to it because of its position of controlling both parties to the merger.
126. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). Guth, the president of Loft, used corporate
resources to develop Pepsi-Cola, a financially troubled corporation of which he had acquired
majority interest. Besides using Loft's resources, Guth had also deprived it of a business opportunity, for he encountered the Pepsi investment in his role as Loft's president. The court
held that Guth's profits were properly the possession of Loft.
127. 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10.
128. 23 Del. Ch. at 273, 5 A.2d at 511.
129. 380 A.2d at 976-77. Delaware courts have announced high standards of fiduciary duty
for years. Unfortunately, on many occasions the standards announced were not enforced. In
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), management was concerned about a possible takeover bid and used corporate funds to purchase shares at a premium in order to retain control.
Although the court "announced" that the directors had a burden to justify the purchase, it
allowed them to satisfy this requirement under a standard of mere business judgment. See
Israels, CorporatePurchaseof Its Own Shares - Are There New Overtones?, 50 CoRN. L.Q. 620,
624 (1965).
Folk has cited several examples where high fiduciary standards were ignored. In both Getty
Oil v. Skelly Oil, 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970) and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del.
1971), a parent was accused of self-dealing transactions with a subsidiary. Rather than place
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standards of fiduciary duty and Justice Duffy's apparent belief in a Delaware
tradition of minority protection, the court was still confronted by the merger
precedents found controlling by the Chancery court.130 Undoubtedly hoping to
avoid the appearance of engineering what was actually a major shift in judicial
philosophy, the court attempted to distinguish such previous cases as Stauffer, 31
Schenley13 2 and Havender.11 It stated that those cases did not involve a merger
in which the minority was totally expelled through a straight "cash for stock"
conversion where the only purpose was elimination of the minority.13 4 The
court noted factual distinctions preventing those cases from serving as direct
precedent. These included the facts that a different merger statute was in force
in Havender, that nonparticipating securities rather than cash were used in the
payoff in Schenley, and, finally, that the dispute in Stauffer involved valuation
practice with no reference to business purpose. 3 5 However, the force of these
distinctions is questionable. Since the statutory requirements were similar, the
analogy should provide some precedential value. The fact that securities rather
than cash were used in the payoff does not mitigate the freeze-out consequences.
In fact, if no active market for the nonparticipating securities exists, that
alternative might be worse than a cash payoff. Finally, a dispute as to valuation
practice suggests potential fraud or self-dealing and should lead to a discussion
of fairness. The fact that business purpose was not specifically mentioned in
such a setting should not affect its applicability to the fairness-fiduciary duty
discussion in Singer.
The merger precedents cited by defendants and the Chancery Court were
disputes in which a dissenting stockholder unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin
a merger, thus indicating an allowable range of management behavior in a
the burden of entire fairness on the parent as Sterling suggested and the lower courts did, the
Delaware supreme court applied a standard of mere business judgment and reversed findings
against the parent in both cases. In Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court
explicitly stated that interlocking directorates do not necessarily mandate a higher burden of
prooL Folk stated that the effect of these decisions was "to confirm the evergrowing scope of
the business judgment rule," an effect hardly conforming with Justice Duffy's belief in
Delaware's high fiduciary standards. See E. FoLx, supra note 56, at 80.
130. The Chancery court found solely on the basis of those Delaware precedents that
satisfaction of statutory requirements was sufficient because courts were not to evaluate the
business purpose of a merger. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
131. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
134. 380 A.2d at 979.
135. The court found the previous merger cases inapposite because they did not include
all the factors present in Singer. It stated that Stauffer, Schenley and Havender were not
interpreted "as approving a merger accomplished solely to freeze-out the minority without a
valid business purpose." Id. at 979. The court was technically correct -this language is not
found in previous cases. The "business purpose test," however, was still something of a
novelty at the time of Bryan in 1974, and the Delaware courts had explicitly rejected motive
as a factor in merger analysis beyond fraud or self-dealing. No logical attorney would argue
"business purpose" in such an atmosphere. Plaintiffs in Schenley did dispute the fairness of
the merger, an allegation apparently analogous to the entire fairness test of Singer. 281 A.2d
at 35. The court dismissed Schenley as precedent, though, on the questionable grounds that
the freeze-out there involved securities of a lesser quality rather than cash. 380 A.2d at 979.
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freeze-out. Those cases had been cited historically in just this capacity. 136 To
this extent, the attempted distinction is weakened. An analysis of the fiduciary
cases cited by the court instead of the allegedly dissimilar merger cases shows
further erosion. 13 7 Except for Sterling,138 which principally involved an attack

upon the majority's valuation technique, not one of the fiduciary cites concerned a merger, 139 leavi'ng the "distinguished" merger precedents more
analogous to Singer. Recognizing the inadequacy of its semantic exercise, the
court employed force where finesse had failed. Holding that statements in the
previous merger cases inconsistent with the immediate opinion were overruled, 140 it belied the obvious: Delaware corporate policy had undergone a
radical change.
The Singer opinion concluded with two basic principles of law. It held that
an equity court has the responsibility to scrutinize a corporate act when its
purpose allegedly violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders.
Secondly, it found that the exercise of corporate machinery to perpetuate majority control is a violation of the fiduciary duty owed the minority.'4
Although the court specifically avoided adopting a business purpose test as
such,' 42 the test of entire fairness advanced by Singer is functionally similar to
the test of Bryan' 43 and Schulwolf.144 These state that there is no violation of
fiduciary duty if a proper business purpose is furthered in the absence of
fraud or self-dealing. The business purpose of the merger was certainly the
major feature of the tests in both Singer and Bryan, but by itself this common
feature does little to remedy the difficulties inherent in the analysis of such a
standard. 45 Questions concerning the definition of proper business purpose
and the party in whose name it must be advanced remain unanswered. 46
One aspect of the business purpose concept was clarified in a subsequent
Delaware Supreme Court case, Tanzer v. International General Industries,

136.

See note 130 supra and accompanying text.

137. The court relied principally upon Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6,
99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953) (stockholder alleged that the majority had issued new shares to impair
his interest); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967)
(action for cancellation of stock allegedly issued to retain control); Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (defendants accused of advancing annual meeting to
thwart challenge to their management positions). 380 A.2d at 979. These cases all concerned
alleged violations of fiduciary duty in efforts to retain control. None involved a merger dispute.
138. See note 125 supra.
139. See note 137 supra; 380 A.2d at 979-80.
140. 380 A.2d at 979.
141. Justice Duffy noted that the use of corporate power solely to eliminate the minority
and without a proper corporate purpose for the merger, was by definition a violation of
fiduciary duty. Id.
142. Id. at 976.
143. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 93-99 supra.
145. For a discussion of business purpose in a merger context, see Borden, supra note 9,
at 1022-23; Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VmG. L. REv. 1019, 1031 (1975).
146. Both parties in the Singer controversy naturally contended that the business purpose
determination should be viewed from their particular vantage point. The court felt that
resolution of the issue was unnecessary for disposition. 380 A.2d at 980 n.11.
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Inc.14 7 Dissenting shareholders of Kliklok Corporation sued to enjoin a merger
with the parent,148 International General Industries, Inc. 149 They argued that
the sole purpose of the merger, to facilitate long term financing, was exclusively
in the parent's interest.' s ° Defendant conceded the point, and the resulting issue
was whether the parent could engineer the merger for its own benefit.' 15
The court again refused to employ a strict business purpose test, emphasizing that, as in Singer, the competing interests between majority and minority
were best evaluated against a standard of entire fairness.52 The court determined that the controlling interest in Tanzer was the fundamental right of the
stockholder to vote its own shares.153 Justice Duffy noted that, consistent with
established principles of Delaware case law, it was not objectionable that a
stockholder's motives be for personal profit, as long as no duty owed fellow
shareholders was violated. 54 The court concluded that International was
justified in voting the Kliklok shares in its own interest.'55
The court emphasized that this voting right was qualified as International's
purpose in causing the merger must be bona fide. Further, it must satisfy obligations imposed by Singer and Sterling of entire fairness to the minority 5
The principal purpose as determined by the Chancellor was the facilitation of
long-term debt financing by International. Although- this satisfied the bona
fide purpose requirement, it was only one facet of the entire fairness test.857
Since the lower court had not discussed the Sterling-Singer-standard, the case
was remanded on that point.58
Considerations apparently beyond the scope of business purpose were present in Young v. Valhi, Inc.,'8 9 in which the Chancellor enjoined a proposed
147. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
148. A parent corporation is one owning a majority of outstanding stock. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
149. Id. at 1122. The merger was engineered through the creation of a shell corporation,
KLK, to which International transferred its holdings of 81% of Kliklok common'stbck. KLIK
and Kliklok then merged in accordance with agreement by the respective directors and stock.
holders, all of which were controlled by International.
150. Id. at 1123.
151. Id. at 1122. The court thus faced the issue which -it had: specifically reserved in
Singer. See note 146 supra.

152. 379 A.2d at 1123.
153.

Id. at 1124.

154. Id. The court based its holding principally upon Riigling, Bros.- Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947), which upheld a voting agreement between two members of the Ringling family as a stockholder's, legitimate exercise of his right
to vote freely. See 60 HARv. L. Rzv. 651 (1947). Ringling followed several similar Delaware
cases which were also cited by the Tanzer court, including Hell v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.,
17 Del. Ch. 214, 151 A. 303 (Ch. 1930) (court refused to enjoin sale of assets allegedly invalid
because of personal benefit motives of majority); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube
Co., 14 Del, Ch. 1, 120 A.486 (Del. 1923) (court refused to enjoin sale of all assets by corpora.
tion challenged on grounds that majority approval was based on personal benefit and
fraudulent motives).
155. 379 A.2d at 1125.
156. Id. at 1124.
157. Id. See notes 180-183.infra and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 1125.
159. 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss4/5

16

Seider:
The Developing Fairness Standard in Freeze-Out Mergers:
[Vol. XXXDetour fo
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
merger on grounds of fairness alone. 160 The proposed merger was between
Valhi Corporation and the majority owner, Contran Corporation.161 Difficulties
arose because Valhi's charter contained a provision requiring the approval of
80 percent of the stockholders in order to accomplish a merger with a coropration holding 5% or more of Valhi's stock. 16 2 Two attempts to acquire the 80
percent approval failed. 10 3 Contran then turned to another provision of the
Valhi charter permitting merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary upon a
majority vote. 164 Contran caused the establishment of Vis Corporation, a
wholly-owned shell of Valhi, and arranged for the instant merger, which dissenting shareholders subsequently moved to enjoin.165
Contran advanced proper business purposes as justification for the merger,
contending that it would result in tax savings and avoid future conflicts of
interest.166 The Chancellor suggested that both reasons appeared contrived,
but held that a final determination of that account was unnecessary. 67 Instead,
the merger was enjoined as an equitable violation, with a finding that it was a
"technically correct but devious corporate action" on Contran's part, undertaken primarily to freeze-out other Valhi stockholders.6s The court labeled the
attempt a prototype of the kind which the Delaware Supreme Court now seeks
to prevent by its application of strict fiduciary standards.69
The implementation of the entire fairness test into Delaware merger
analysis was completed in Kemp v. Angel.170 The Chancery court held that the
standard applicable to long-form mergers in Singer and Tanzer should be employed in short-form mergers as well.' 7 ' Kemp represented a distinct change in
attitude from previous law on the subject. The decision was reached in spite of
160.

Id. at

1379.

161. Contran Corporation owned 55% of the outstanding common stock of Valhi. Id. at
1373.
162. Id. at 1375. Such a provision is intended to prevent takeovers through tender raids.
See notes 11 & 12 supra.
163. Contran first attempted to obtain approval of the merger by the required 80%
through a November 1976 vote. In January 1977, Contran offered a newly created preferred
stock in exchange for minority stockholder shares. This second proposal failed by an even
greater margin. 382 A.2d at 1375.
164. Id. at 1376.
165. Vis and Valhi were to merge with the merger agreement requiring the purchase of
outstanding Valhi stock. The freezing out of dissenting shareholders would free Contran to
merge with the Valhi-Vis entity. Id.
166. Id. at 1377.
167. Contran was basically a holding company, with over 90% of its assets consisting of
Valhi common stock. It engaged in land development to a limited extent. Previous conflicts of
interest involving allocation of land development opportunties between parent and subsidiary
were minimal. The court found that the conflict contention was somewhat "contrived" in the
instant fact situation.
The court also found that the tax savings could be achieved by means other than the
proposed merger. Thus, while it offered no final opinion on the validity of the business
reasons, its tone was clearly skeptical. Id.
168. Id. at 1378. See note 165 supra.
169. 382 A.2d at 1378.
170. Unreported decision annotated at [1978] 434 SEc. REG. & L. Rap. (BNA) A-12 (Del.
Ch. 1977).
171. id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5

1978]

FAIRNESS STANDARD IN FREEZE-OUT MERGERS

Stauffer, which had held that the singular remedy in a short-form merger dispute was appraisal7 2 and added that the specific purpose of the short-form
173
statute was to provide an efficient means of eliminating minority interest.
The court issued a preliminary injunction in Kemp with provision for a subsequent hearing where the burden would be on the majority to demonstrate the
74
entire fairness of the merger according to the Sterling-Singer test.'
PRESENT STATUS OF THE DELAWARE STANDARD
75

Sterling- had been the definitive fiduciary standard in Delaware for 25
years, and, in principle, had been a viable entity. In practice, however, that
simply was not the case. On most occasions mere lip service was directed to the
strict Sterling standard, and the fact of life for dissenting shareholders was
that self-dealing had to be evident or a standard of mere business judgment 7 8
would be employed. 177 This had been the Catch-22 of Delaware's corporate
law: In a merger dispute the court would announce that where one party had
controlling interest of both corporate entities, Sterling placed the burden on
that majority holder to prove the entire fairness of the transaction; however,
the qualification was that the minority shareholder had to prove self-dealing
before the Sterling standard applied. The minority's burden to prove self-dealing in a given situation was nearly insurmountable; without shifting the initial
burden on the majority through the Sterling rule, the dissenting shareholder
8
had little hope of qualifying for the Sterling standard..7
172. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962). See text accompanying notes 46-48
supra.

173. 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
174. [1978] 484 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12 (Del. Ch. 1977). The test adopted by
Kemp, although not one of strict business purpose, was centered around purpose and was
functionally similar to the short-form merger standard of New York in Tanzer. See note 99
supra.
-.
175. See text accompanying notes 125-127 supra.
176. A standard of business judgment presumes the good faith of the board of directors
or management, placing the burden upon a dissenting shareholder to prove bad faith or
self-dealing. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (business judgment standard applied to
determine liability of directors and top management); Isaacs v. Forer, 89 Del. Chi. 105, 159
A.2d 295 (Ch. 1960) (directorial good faith presumed in derivative suit against directors concerning corporate option plan). For a history of the business judgment rule, see Lewis, The
Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR
L.Rv. 157 (1970).

177. See E. Forx, supranote 56, at 334-35.
178. An illustration is provided by Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
Sinclair was a 97% owner of Sinven, a Venezuelan subsidiary. A minority stockholder of
Sinven alleged that Sindair's policy of having Sinven pay dividends 88 million dollars in
excess of its earnings over a seven year period deprived Sinven of capital for expanding its
market and was done because Sinclair needed cash and wished to prevent Sinven's expansion.

Plaintiff also alleged that Sinclair denied Sinven its fair share of contracts, allowing expansion of wholly-owned subsidiaries instead. The Chancery court found for plaintiffs when
Sinclair could not satisfy its burden of proving entire fairness per Sterling. The Delaware
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the intrinsic fairness standard applied only if plaintiff
proved self-dealing by the parent. Because of a presumption of good faith management, the
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Through the adoption of the Sterling-Singer rule, Delaware presents a
standard which is theoretically more demanding than the Bryan and Schulwolf
business purpose test.

79

The Delaware standard is couched in fiduciary terms

with business purpose being a subset of the whole. The Singer opinion explicitly stated that a merger may be enjoined despite having a valid business
purpose, as it must satisfy all aspects of the entire fairness standard. s0 Unfortunately, there was no indication as to which factors beyond business purpose were entailed. Noting this ambiguity, the concurring opinion' 81 recommended that in instances of going private,112 Sterling should provide the
avenue of judicial scrutiny. Sterling dictated that this scrutiny involve factors
of "business purpose, or economic necessity, desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of self-serving, manipulation, or overreaching, and all other
''
relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or unfairness." 83
Young suggests that the Delaware standard extends beyond a business purpose analysis to a determination of motivation of the party initiating the
merger. Upon examination, however, the holding is not the extension beyond
business purpose that it would appear on its face. There was little doubt that
the court in Young felt that the proposed business purposes were contrived.184
As such, it found that the actions of Contran were inequitable and manipulative. 8 5 Had a proper business purpose existed, though, the same type of motivation would not have been present. As a practical matter, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which, although a proper business purpose is evidenced,
a merger would be enjoined due to a breach of fiduciary duty. Some clarification in this regard should arise from subsequent judicial treatment of factual
settings like the one in Tanzer, where even though a bona fide business purpose
was established, the case was remanded for consideration under the entire fairness doctrine. 1 6 However, it is suggested that such a remand is in the interest
of form and consistency rather than substance; if the merger evidences a proper
business interest, then it necessarily does not evidence self-dealing or fraud.
The lower court can do little more than go through the motions while affirming the merger.
Even if this analysis should prove correct, preventative corporate lawyers
seeking to insure a merger's fidelity are left with the question of what conburden on plaintiff was immense since the withholding of a specific business opportunity or
a disproportionate dividend payout would have to be shown. No specific withholding was
shown and the dividends of Sinven paid in excess of earnings were delivered pro rata to the
3% minority as well. Thus, a standard of mere business judgment was employed.

179. See text accompanying notes 142-144 supra.
180. 380 A.2d at 980.
181. Justice McNeilly, concurring, agreed with Justice Duffy's holding and also felt that
standards should be provided concerning the requirements of entire fairness. Id. at 982.
182. The reference to "going private" was apparently utilized in a general sense pertaining to any freeze-out. It would be irrational to employ the Sterling factors in the analysis of

a merger where deregistration, the technical "going private," was involved, yet not grant the
protection to stockholders of smaller corporations.

183. 380 A.2d at 982.
184. 382 A.2d at 1377. See note 167 supra.
185. Id. at 1378.
186. See text accompanying notes 157-158 supra.
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stitutes a proper business purpose. It has been determined that such a purpose
must further bona fide interests of the corporation." 7 Avoidance of conflicts of
interest and increase in operating efficiency through consolidation, as in
Schulwolft8 s and Grimes,'8 9 and facilitation of long-term debt financing as in
Tanzer,190 have been found valid purposes, although this list is by no means
exclusive. Probably the most significant of the recent developments in this area
was the conclusion in Tanzer that the corporate purpose may be that of the
parent 91 Any other conclusion would cause considerable hardship in supporting a merger, as the analysis would degenerate into a metaphysical mire in
analyzing interests of a corporation and shareholders which no longer existed.192 After Tanzer, merger analysis will involve a standard balancing test weighing the interest of the parent against that of the dissenting shareholder in
light of the appraisal remedy.
EFFECTS OF THE STERLING-SINGER STANDARD

It is suggested that Singer was a reaction by the Delaware supreme court to
outside stimuli. The opinion was intended not only to decide the fate of the
dissenting shareholder, but to transcend those facts and silence the critics of
Delaware's corporate practices. Delaware's corporate policy has drawn criticism
from a number of commentators over the years.1 93 Recently this criticism has
entered a new forum, the Senate Commerce Committee, which has conducted
hearings on proposals concerning national incorporation and federal minimum
standards legislation.1 94 One letter sent to the Committee was of particular significance. It criticized the deterioration of state corporation standards brought
about by Delaware's history of enabling legislation and contended that state
law was no longer adequate protection for investors.1 5 The message was signed
by eighty law professors, including Gary, Brudrey, and Chirelstein.ge Also
187. Bryan v. Brock &Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1974).
188. See note 96 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 82-90 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 156-157 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 154-155 supra. Additionally, Schuiwolf held that source
of financing or benefit to the parent was not a grounds for injunction if a bona fide corporate
purpose was advanced. 86 Misc. 2d at 298-99, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
. 192. If the court required that a business purpose of the subsidiary be advanced, the
ensuing analysis would prove somewhat confusing. The parent might argue that the coiporate
business would be more profitable after the merger, but that may not qualify as a bona fide
corporate purpose. Certainly the interests of the subsidiary's stockholders would not be
furthered in that instance, for they would have already been deprived of their shares. The
resulting issue would be one concerning the capacity of the corporation in a business purpose
test-should the purpose be advantageous to the corporate business or to the shareholders of
the corporation.
193. See note 55-66 supra and accompanying text.
194.

Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Com-

merce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
195. The letter was the combined effort of Professors Chirlestein of Yale, Schwartz of
Georgetown and Stevenson of George Washington University, and was delivered to the committee by Professor Chambers of Michigan. Id. at 343.
196. Id. at 343. Professor Cary of Columbia has authored several articles concerning
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pressing for federal standards was the Center for Corporate Accountability,
19 7
represented by Ralph Nader.
Delaware's problems in this regard were recently compounded as a result of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 98 which limited internal corporate disputes to state forums. Plaintiff
Green sought to enjoin a short-form merger to be accomplished under Delaware law. 199 Rather than challenge precedent in the state court, Green instead
filed a lOb-52°0 action in federal court, alleging that the merger was an unfair
or deceptive practice according to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.201 Relief
was granted to Green and a dissenting shareholder in a companion case by the
Second Circuit.202 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Securities
Acts were intended to provide for full disclosure, not to establish standards of
fairness for intra-corporate disputes.2 0s It specifically stated that the internal
affairs of a corporation should be exclusively the concern of state law.2- As a
result, more intense attention and criticism were focused on Delaware, because
its corporations' minority stockholders were without recourse except in the
state forums.20 5 Prolonged criticism from commentators combined with the
recent hearings by the Commerce Committee and the Green decision, which
antedated Singer by only a few months, 20 6 put tremendous pressure on the
Singer court, giving rise to the adoption of the Sterling-Singer standard.
Granting that Singer was a reaction to that pressure and was intended to
silence the critics, its effect on future policy both in Delaware and the nation
remains uncertain. Delaware's passage and management-oriented interpretation
corporate responsibility and is joint author of a corporations casebook. See note 38 supra.
Professors Brudrey of Virginia and Chirlestein of Yale are both well known authors in the
field and are co-authors of a corporate finance textbook.
197. Mr. Nader and the Center for Corporate Responsibility, expressing concern over
both the rights of individuals as shareholders and the political influence exerted by the
major corporations, would welcome federal chartering. 1976 Hearings, supra note 194, at 197206.
198. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §253 (1974 & Supp. 1977). 430 U.S. at 465.
200. Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. §i240.10b-5 (1976), was promulgated under authority of §I0b
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970).
201. Section 10b outlaws the employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance." 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970).
202. Relief was granted to dissenting shareholders in a merger dispute under a lOb-5 cause
of action in Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2nd Cir. 1976) and Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2nd Cir. 1976). For an analysis of these holdings, see Note,
The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1184
(1976); Banoff, Fraud Without Deceit, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1977).
203. 430 U.S. at 478-80. For a discussion of the Court's rationale, see Comment, 29 U.
FLA. L. REv. 761 (1977).
204. The Court reiterated the holding of Cort v. Ash: "Corporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect
to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation. 430 U.S. at 479
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
205. See note 82 supra.
206. Green was decided in March of 1977 while the Singer court was in deliberation for
the September opinion.
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of enabling legislation has been the primary cause of the "race for the bottom." 207 If Delaware's reaction to years of criticism is a bona fide change of
08
policy, it may signal a trend toward state protection of investors. 2
The psychological atmosphere implicit in the "race" phenomenon has been
disrupted by Delaware's voluntary, if not complete, withdrawal. Perhaps other
states will no longer formulate corporate codes which will "out-Delaware
Delaware," as was Michigan's intention in a recent revision.20 9 The move by
Delaware may also serve as an illustration of the inevitable to the other states
- that they police themselves, or the federal government will intercede.2 10
It is interesting that Justice Duffy took the Singer opinion out of the
standard business purpose/valuation context and wrote instead in terms of
fiduciary duty. By doing so, the standard applied to directors in Guth2- and
Sterling22 was applicable to the majority in Singer as well. Carried to its logical
extremes, such a fiduciary rationale would carry Delaware toward the California standard developed in Jones. 213 Rather than an obligation of statutory
compliance, as in Stauffer, or a duty not to harm the minority as in Bryan and
Schulwolf, the majority would have an affirmative duty to offer the minority an
alternative at least as acceptable as the one itfashioned for itself.21 ' Such a
policy is well beyond the dictates of Singer, but any further move in the direction of the Jones standard would undoubtedly be met with great academic
interest.
Conversely, the reaction of the court may not represent a bona fide policy
shift, but rather an attempt to preserve a vested commercial interest. Above all
else, Delaware has demonstrated a marked desire to attract corporate registrations. As a result, up to one-fourth of all state revenues in some years was sup.
plied through corporate franchise taxes.215 Federal minimum standards legislation would require that all states observe at least a designated level of investor
protection - a level higher than that historically provided by Delaware. Such
legislation would neutralize D'laware's attraction as a corporate haven. In
207. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
208. The move by Delaware may be too late to interrupt the trend toward enabling
legislation. Protessor Folk has termed the trend "irreversible." See note 60 supra. Optimistic
signs exist but are outweighed by increased enabling legislation and prophecies of federal
intervention. See note 196 infra. See, e.g., Berkowitz v.'Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36,
342 A.2d 566 (1975) (freeze-out merger enjoined under state law); People v. Concord Fabrics,
Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (successful suit by attorney general
brought pursuant to state law to enjoin freeze-out merger).
209. Downs, supranote 60, at 914.
210. Commentators have forecasted federal intervention for some time. Professor Folk has
referred to the possibility of state legislative self-regulation as "vain hope." Folk, State
Statutes: Their Role in PrescribingNorms of Responsible Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAwh.
'1031, 1074 (1976). See also Loss, The-American Law Institutes FederalSecurities Code Project,
25 Bus. LAw. 27, 34 (1969).
211. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
212. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 100-109 supra.
214. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
215. See testimony of Professor H.J. Goldschmid, Columbia University School of Law,
1976 Hearings,supra note 194, at 244.
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cognizance of this, the reaction by the Singer court may have been of a purely
defensive nature: from Delaware's vantage, it is better that it voluntarily adhere to criticism now for some indefinite period than to further antagonize
those urging federal standards.2 16 The national influence resulting from the
Singer decision may be much different if accommodation was its underlying
goal. The immediate effect would be the same whatever the motive since the
decision is a definitive move on its face toward investor protection, and the
court did not admit to any commercial influence on its holding. However, if
commercial interest is the true motive, the application of Sterling-Singer
principles will be of narrow scope, with the added caveat that the life expectancy of the new standard will be a function of the duration of the federal
incorporation controversy.Y7 The original Sterling standard all but atrophied
once. If the plans for federal incorporation are avoided, there is no reason why
218

it would not disappear once again.

CONCLUSION

In a freeze-out merger dispute, the present Delaware standard of fairness is
the one dictated by the Sterling-Singer test. It requires that the dominant party,
due to its control of both corporate entities in the merger, establish the entire
fairness of the transaction. 'This fiduciary standard, theoretically broader than
the Bryan and Schulwolf tests, is principally characterized by the requirement
that a valid business purpose be present. As a practical matter, if a bona fide
purpose exists, the merger will almost certainly be found valid, thus allowing
preventative lawyers to examine the legality of a proposed merger from that
viewpoint. While the Sterling-Singer test must be granted prima fade status as
a bona fide shift in Delaware policy toward investor protection, the reaction
216. Such critical reaction was well illustrated by the letter sent by the law professors to
the committee hearing which stated: "[Wlith the Supreme Court apparently in the process of

drawing limits against the further expansion of federal regulation of corporations through
the medium of securities laws . . . there is a particular urgency at this time for the Congress
to consider some form of federal intervention." 1976 Hearings,supra note 194, at 543.

217. Even without an actual modification of the Singer opinion, the Delaware Supreme
Court may already have left means of escaping fiduciary enforcement. Singer's future effect
depends partly on what the courts will accept as a business purpose. In the pleadings in
Singer and Kemp management did not advance a business purpose, but instead contended only

that it had followed statutory provisions. If the court wished to limit fiduciary duty, it could
decide a Singer fact situation differently by recognizing "going private" as a legitimate business purpose. "Going private" would save the corporation money, free management from
shareholder difficulties and allow corporate concentration on other matters. This reasoning

should not be accepted as evidencing a bona fide purpose, but Delaware may do so if the
federal incorporation controversy recedes.
Similarly, a freeze-out might go unscathed if securities are used in the pay-off rather than
cash. The Singer court specifically phrased its holding in terms of a "cash-out." Future cases
may indicate that use of debt securities enables a merger to escape Singer guidelines, thus

allowing dominant stockholders to freeze-out the minority as long as non-participating, nonvoting stock or some other undesirable security is used instead of cash.

218. Sterling was handed down in 1952, with subsequent cases such as Bruce (1961),
Stauffer (1962) and Schenley (1971) indicating that its holding was neither widespread nor
long-lived. See notes 43-66 supra and accompanying text.
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may have been motivated by commercial interest, thus leaving the standard
with a narrow scope of application and faint hope for an extended life.
WILLIAM M. SEIDER
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